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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,J[l('JL\EL .\IOXTGO.\IERY, 
,JJAH l E .\I OX'l1 GO.\rnRY, 
Ll\"Jl,\ .\[OXTGO.\IERY, 
''>- tliPir gu;mliall ad litcm 
,\L\ HIE D~\ YIS, and 
BEHX J('E ·wooD POD ROZA, 
Plaintiffs and Respondeuts, 
-YR.-
PREFJ<JRRED RISK ~IUTUAL 
L\'BrR~\:JCE CO~IP ANY, 
a corpora ti on, 
/Jef1'111la11t a111l Appellant. 
Case 
Ko. 10278 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
8'l'A TE.\IENT OF THE CASE 
This case, as outli11cd in appellant's statement of 
facts hPlo\Y, illvolves the question as to whether or not 
<111 a utorno hil<' lia hility iHsnrer has been substantially 
]'l'r'.irnlic<•<l in a Ia-wsuit by reason of the insured 's total 
disa [l[J<'n nrnce to testify at trial on his own behalf when 
hi, 10:-;1 imolly is the only eYiclence for the defense. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case here on appeal is thr result of a pn•i·irJu, 
case in the same district wherein the plaintiffs in tliP 
instant case obtained a judgment against the clriwr r,f 
an automobile which at the time of the accidr>nt 11w 
insured by the appellant Thereafter the plaintiffs (n-
spondents) brought direct action on their jucl)..'1nc 111 
against the insurer resulting in a jnclgme11t agairn;t th1 
msurer (appellant), 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief sought by defendant (appellant) is rc·1·rr 
sal of the lower court's judgment in farnr of plai11tif,, 1 
(respondents) and an order di rccting a ju<l1-,'1Ile11t i11 
favor of defendant (appellant) of no cause o fadion. 
STATEMENT OF F..:\ CTS 
The appellant, Preferred Risk ~f utnal 1 nsuramc , 
Company, issued its automobile insnra1wr poli<'~- ( !•>: 
hibit 17) to one Willard ·wood covering a J~l.J/ ileRoto. 
On June 25, 1957, the vehicle was involved in an ae!'i-
dent while being driven by 2\Ir, "\Vood 's son, Dnrrel 
There was no other car involved and au action 11·ns 
brought against the son, Darrel Wood, hy two of tl1e 
three passengers, one Bernice \Vood and the heirs of :i 
second passenger, one Lois Montgomery, wl10 <lir>d il' 
a result of her injuries. The action was eomrnt•11rNl i11 
the Second District Court for Davis Couutv, tlw reesi-
dence of the defendant, and an Answer wns filed on 
behalf of the defendant hy the attorneys for :ippl'llnnt 
Shortly thereafter, appellant obtained :i sworn romt 
2 
1q1orter statement (Exhibit 13) from the defendant as 
11 ~11ns1111(' from the remaining fourth passenger (Exhibit 
11), 011e Law re11ee Merrick. It is to he note<l here that 
~fcrri('k \l'<ts nsleep at the time the aeeillent oecurred and 
c1,11 irl e-iY<' 110 pc•rtinent facts of tl1e occurrences surround-
ill gtlil' a('cident itself (Exhibit 14, p. 1-!), (T. 40, L. 17). 
Xutliiu;.; of significance occurred thereafter until 
:\11r1•rnlier, l~l:J8, at which time the plaintiffs took the 
,i,.p1Jsi1101t of the drfornla11t (J<~xhibit B). Follo-wing 
it,; t 1 ;11b1Tipt ion it was maile11 to the insured 1Yith in-
'trnctio11s to Jinn· the dl•fenc1ant real1, correct, sign, haYe 
11otariz1·11, mll1 return to appellant's counsel within ten 
1t<ib (E\:l1il1it +). The <lepositioH was not returned 
:i11•l tli1 r1·<1ftl'r all !'fforts to locate him were to no an1il. 
,\ll li•t\1·rs to tlil' 0111:-· addrc:-;ses of the c1efenda11t 1nrc 
r1·lnr1:1•1l, marked "mon)d left 110 address" (Exhiliits 1. 
~'. ;, I. a11d 8). Dnring- this period arn1 subsequent, ef-
f11rl.-: \1 n1· rnn1k to locatl' the defornlant through his par-
1 J1L;, 1111· i11snred 's <1ttorney, and tlte DaYis County At-
t11rnc·» ! Exl1ihits IT, Jlp. 2, 3; 12, p. 2: T. 16, L. 1; T. 63, 
T.. ~OJ nil to 110 an1i1. His parents L1ic1 not know his 
' l1Pr1•;1I1out s d urirn~ the period shortly after the accident 
1.Tirnr, 19:J7) (T. 02, L. 1) until 1962 (the trial 1rns heard 
11 11 :'\1'pl1·mher 12, 1961). The defendant's wife also 
mon·d witltont a forwarding· address ('r. 36, L. 3}. Also 
il11ri11g- t!tis p<'riod a \rnrnmt 1Yas issued for his arrest in 
!l~ri~ ( 'ount~· :md he 1rns not located lJy the police until 
l :ir;~ ('I'. 4-:J, L. 24). 
After pretrial the trial 1rns set and heard on Sep-
1i·mlirr 12, 1961, resulting in a judgment against the de-
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fendant. Prior to commencement of the trial, appellauto 
counsel made an outline of its position ( ExhilJit I'' 
which restated its position outlined at the pretrial IE:i' 
hibit 11). 
Thereafter the instant action was broug-ht agaii!'I 
the insurer, appellant, the defense of which \ms liasc·rl (JJi 
the non-cooperation clause of the polic)· whieh nwls" 
follows (Exhibit 17): 
CONDITION 18 
"The insured shall eoopera te \\·ith the eompa111 
and, upon the company's reqm•st, shall alt1·11tl 
hearings and trials and shall mrnist ill rffr('li11~ 
settlements, securing and giving e\·i<lellce, ol1tai11-
ing the attem1ance of witllesses ancl in the (·011 
duct of suits ... '' 
Had the insured heen present for the trial m1rl a'· 
suming he testified as he did ill his sworn stah•m(•nt ;wl 
deposition, his evidence eonceruing tl1e <\('('idc•11t 1n1nl1l 
have been as follow::-;: 
a. Lois l\Iontgomery, one of the plaintiffs, !incl 
been driving prior to the accidellt hut \ras ~can1l 
of driYing after dark and in m1kllo\rn coirntrr 
(Exhibit 13, p. 20). 
b. Lawrence l\Ierrick, the third 1rnsse11ger, li: 11 l 
bad eyes (referring to his driving) ([~xhihit 11 
p. 21(. 
c. He was traveling within the sp(•<'d limit (Ex 
hibit 1a, p. 22; Exl1iliit 1:1, p. 32). 
cl. He believed the cause of the acciclent was n 
blowout (Exhibit 13, p. 24). 
e. 'rhere was no protest as to liis m;inm•r of rlrii-
ing (Exhibit 13, p. 27). 
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f. J fl> was not under the influenee of intoxicating 
liquor (Exhibit 13, p. :n). 
ft i.-, thus apparent that his testimony would have 
Leen c1iamdrieally opposed to that of the plaintiff's 
C\ itlenre. 
ARGU~rENT 
POINT I 
THF~ COUR'r ERRED IN F AILIING TO FIND 
THAT THE INSURED FAILED TO COOP-
KHATJ;~ WITH THE DEFENDANT AND 
'I'IL\T f-lUCII FAILURE WAS A SUBSTAN-
TIAL PRE.J~DICE TO THE IKSURER. 
Some eourts ha\·e taken the position that the mere 
ah~(·uce of an insurecl from the trial is in itself a mate-
rial hrea<'li of the condition requiring the cooperation of 
tlJC· insun•<l so that the insurer's burden of establishing 
tli1· lirP;wh is satisfied by merely showing tlw fact of non-
at!c11da11l'L' or rdusal to testify. 7 Am . .Jnr. 2d 517. Other 
conrt.s i1wlm1ing our ow11 haYe held, howeYer, that failure 
of the insun•d to attem1 the trial standing alone is insuffi-
r·i('11t. lll Ol1erlia11sley Y. J'racelers l11s11rancc Compa11y, 
,j c·tah 2<1 1.\ tlie eonrt held: 
"'rJ10ugli a11 1111rrasoiiablc (emphasis added) fail-
nn· by insured to attend the trial and testify when 
l1P is a material wit11ess is a breaeh of coopera-
tion dause in automohile liability policy where 
failmc• to appear is excusable or justifiable and 
Jllif 1c itl/() 11 t good reaso 11 (emphasis added), it does 
not, in it:-;df, eonstitnte laek of cooperation with-
i ug 1'Ueh policy.'' 
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Also, 
'' E,-en if insured 's failure to attend trial were l'io. 
lation of cooperation clause in automobilr• Jia_ 
hility policy, unless insurance company is , 11 J,. 
stantially prejudiced hy such absence, it is uot a 
ntlid defense against the injured third party." 
It would thus appear, therefore, that if the ill~Ul'1'ii 
fails to attend the trial without a valid excuse, ju.stificu-
tion, or good reason, he has breached the eooprr;ili1'11 
clause of the policy. As i11clicate<l ahon, hcrn·en•r, for 
a valid defense of uon-cooperation the failure to attf'llll 
the trial must result in substantial prejudice to the 
insurer. 
Therefore, it seems the question to lH' cletermi1wil 
on this appeal is whether or not the illsnrecl 's foilm1' 111 
attend the trial, to sign and return deposition, or to arl 
,-ise and make known his \\·hereabouts so that tliL· im111e1 
could take his deposition for use at the trial resultrcl i11 
a substantial prejudice to the insurer. This \rr heli''\I' 
to be the case. Aside from the fad that tl1P i11~urhl'' 
testimony as per his statement (Exhihit 1;>) nrnl rn1-
signecl copy of his deposition ( E:d1 i hit 1:-l) \\/Is ( nrn-
pletely incongruous with th0 testimmi:i· of th0 plaintit: 
at the trial would clearl.v irnlirnt0 that 11is tc·>'!inw11y \111., 
exreme1;- ,-ital to his defense arnl more partieulnrl.r so 
by reason of the fact that he \\·as thP !ml~- witJJess to the 
accident that could refute tl1l' C'vicl011re of the plai11tiff,. 
This we believe to lw far more importnnt in a ,~itunti 1111 
such as this wherein it is a 011e-car aeci<le11t aml the illlly 
persons with knowledge of what actnall)" oecurrecl '11" 
the occupants of the car. This i:-; also horne out liy tlie 
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trial judge in his Memorandum Decision (R. 26) wherein 
t!JP Court stated (P. 3): 
''If hclieYecl, (referring to the insured 's state-
ment [Exhibit 15] and the unsigned copy of the 
deposition [Exhibit 13]) it would be a complete 
defrnse to the action.'' 
l'.11der this set of cirenmstances and more so in view 
of the fact that the plaintiffs had to onrcome the provi-
sio11s of our guest statute, it would seem readily apparent 
that the illsured 's failure to appear at the trial is the epit-
ome of 11011-eoopcration and created not only substantial 
prejmlicP hut aetually total and absolute prejudice which 
in 1w wa)' ecmld lie overcome by the insurer. 
The Court also in its ~Iemorandum Decision observes 
tliat th<:' insurer did not ask any questions at the time 
plaintiffs took the deposition of the insured. We do not 
fr.el tl1is to he either unusual or inconsistent with the 
usual pradiec of defense attorneys. Certainly if the 
insur<:'r's attorneys had had any inkling of the mrnYaila-
hility of hiwing the insured present for trial his deposi-
tion would liavc been taken or would have thoroughly 
1·niss-exami11cd all<l wai,·ed his signature at the time the 
plailltiffs took insured 's deposition ( T. 15, L. 12). 
We hclien the law of a great majority of jurisdc-
tions iR generally stated in 139 A. L. R. 7~J3 as follows: 
Conduct on the part of the assured which makes it 
impos;;ible for the insurer to get in touch with 
him in the face of an impending trial, although 
<liligont search was made for him, justifies a con-
clusion that the assured has failed to meet the 
condition of the policy rnquiring him to rooprr 
ate with the insurer, so as to relieYe the immrcr of 
liability thereunder, where th0 t0stimo11~· of th,, 
insured was material. <'urraJ1 Y. C1n111el'fi111f ] 11. 
dcm11ity Co111pa11y (Hl-U) 127 Conn. G9:2, :211 .\. 
2d 87. 
Our position is borne out further in 60 A. L. H. :2d llil: 
"(the court) stating that there' could hC' 110 doul1t 
that the insured 's failure to coopNatP \ms both 
prejudicial and injurious to the garnisl1P1· i11,m1·i, 
where the insured, dri\·er of one of the antomn. 
biles inYolwd in a collisioll in \Yhiel1 th1• pl<1i11-
tiffs were injured, dis a pp ea red from hl'r hom1· t11 
avoid arrest and prosecution for unlawful arfoi. 
ties not related to the accident, sr'YC'l'al 111011tl1.' 
before the suits were initiated agaiJ1st hl'r l11·l11 
that the trial court should han' dirrdPcl 11 nr 
diet for the insurer as a math>r of la\\·. .\ltl1ou.d1 
the court recognized the rule that thr insmn lwil 
the hurde11 of proYing that tl1e l>rl'<teh of thr· 
clause was such as to r0sult in suhstaHtial prcjn 
dice and injury to its position, it statecl that .•;i1ch 
prejudice was shown sillee thP iJ1surc1l 1rn~ i1nl 
onl~· an essential witness at the trial, lmt tl1e uni; 
witness for the defernw, arnl her :1i1l \ms 11\!crs-
sary for the 11reparation an1l trial of tl111 ,nit' 
against ]:er. Rejecfo1g tl1C' eonkntion that lwr ali-
sence was not injurious hPr·aus0 i-;lll' !ind no nwil'· 
rial evidence to offer a11d JIO Yalid 1lefr11~r· to th1· 
charcre of ne<r]i,,ence tlie court said that ('\'('ll it 
' h 1':"'I b ' 
Also, 
the insured's liahility \\·as elpar, tlil• i11,.;1m·1 wa' 
prejw1iC'ed l>~· lier failurP to co11tl'st tl1P impor-
tant issue of the amount of darnagei-; 1o lH' ;111nnl-
ed." Cameron v. Bcr,r;er, 7 A. 2d 2!l:1. 
"Assured 's Yiolation of d~lllSl' in automobile· i11 
clemnity policy hy failure to cooperate in defr1 10 '' 
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of action by injured party held valid defense in ac-
tion h;· injured party against insurer after obtain-
iug ju<lgrne11t against assured where insurer was 
prejudiced h;· assured 's violation of cooperation 
dauRe." Jh!Ja11els v. Ocw:ral Insurance Com-
pr111y of ~1merica, et al, 36 P. 2d 829. 
Also (referring to assured 's failure to attend trial after 
gi\·iug insurer report that he was free from blame): 
"'\\' e are also of the opinion and we think most 
of the authorities are agree(l that the provision 
(eooperation) must he one reasonably necessary 
for 1l1e protection of the insurance company, and 
one· which can readily he complied with by the 
assu1wl; and the violation of the condition by the 
assnn'd cam10t he a valid defense against the in-
jurerl party unless in the particular case it ap-
pvars that the insurance company was substan-
tiall.\· prejudiced thereby. Here these elements 
<ll'l' all present. To require the cooperation of 
the assured to the> extent of attendance at the trial, 
wlil'll 11l' is a material and important witness, in a 
perfodly rea:,;onahle condition. Failure to tes-
ti±\ may he as damaging as failure to give notice 
of the accident of of the suit. There is, of course, 
i10 obligation on his part to testify favorably to 
thP l'ompany 's interests, but here this report of 
the acci<k>nt irnlicatecl that a defense existed, and 
it would normally be expected that his testimony 
would hear this out. U11der these circumstances 
the• <·ompm1y was clc>arl.\· prejudiced by his failure 
to nppl•ar. ''II y11di11g \'. llo111c Accident l11surauce 
Crn111;a1u1, 7 P. 2cl 999. 
Also in,1p1ile111a11, Vol. 8, p.148: 
'"l'he Yoluntary disappearance of the insured and 
his eonsequent failure to atteml the trial, has been 
liPJ<l to release the insurer of its obligation under 
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the policy." Hoff Y. St. Pa11l Mercury l11rlc11111ity 
Company, 74 F. 2c1 689; Klei11sch 111it Y. Farmers 
Mutual Hail Ins11ra11ce Associatio11, 101 F. 98i; 
Associated Indem11it y Corporation '" Daris, 45 F. 
Supp. J18; Hy11di11g \'. Tlome Ar·cidrnt Insura11ce 
Company, 7 P. 2cl 999; Scli11eider v. A11foist M
11
• 
tual l11s11rance C'o111pa11y, :3-1-6 Ill. 137; H11tt '" 
Tracelcrs I11s11ra11ce Cmnpa11y, 110 N .. J.L. 5i: 
Mionis v. Merchants M11t11al Casualty Compa11y, 
172 N.Y.S. 2d 727. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the facts as reYealed hy the rrrord in 
this matter and the law as discuss eel and presented here-
in, we do not feel that the finding of the trial court ('311 
be reconciled either to the facts or the facts to the law. 
The court's reasoning and findings to reach thP result 
are as illogical as portions of its ~Iemornllllum DPrision 
inferring that the insurer denloped the situation delilr 
erately ·when the insurer had eYerything to gain and noth-
ing to lose by haYing the insure<l present at tl1e trial to 
testify. 
Appellant here\\·ith respecti'nll:· requests the court to 
reverse the judgment of this district conrt. 
Respectfully snlJrnite<l, 
KIPP AND ( 'I-IARLIRR 
TEL c H..\.ltLIEH 
520 Bosto11 Building 
Salt Lake City, Ftah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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